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We investigate the role of sectoral diﬀerences in labor productivity and the process of struc-
tural transformation (the secular reallocation of labor across sectors) in accounting for the
time path of aggregate productivity across countries. Using a simple model of the struc-
tural transformation that is calibrated to the growth experience of the United States, we
measure sectoral labor productivity diﬀerences across countries. These diﬀerences are large
and systematic: labor productivity diﬀerences between rich and poor countries are large
in agriculture and services and smaller in manufacturing. When fed into the model, these
sectoral labor productivity diﬀerences and the structural transformation they produce ac-
count for more than 50 percent of the fast catch-up in aggregate productivity observed in
less developed economies and all of the stagnation and decline observed in more developed
economies in recent decades.
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11 Introduction
It is a well-known observation that over the last 50 years countries have experienced remark-
ably diﬀerent paths of economic performance.1 Looking at the behavior of GDP per hour
of individual countries relative to that of the United States we ﬁnd experiences of sustained
catch-up, catch-up followed by a slow-down, stagnation, and even decline (see Figure 1 for
some illustrative examples).2 Consider for instance the experience of Japan. Between 1960
and 2000, GDP per hour in Japan relative to that of the United States rose from about
20 percent to about 60 percent.3 Spain also experienced a period of rapid catch-up to the
United States from 1960 to the mid 70s, a period during which relative GDP per hour rose
from about 40 to 65 percent. In the mid 70s, however, this process slowed-down dramati-
cally and relative GDP per hour in Spain stagnated until 2000. Another remarkable growth
experience is that of New Zealand where in 1970 GDP per hour was close to that of the
United States but by 2000 it had fallen to less than 70 percent.
Along their modern path of development countries undergo a process of structural trans-
formation by which labor is reallocated among agriculture, industry, and services. Over
the last 50 years many countries have experienced substantial amounts of labor reallocation
across sectors. For instance, from 1960 to 2000, the share of employment in agriculture in
Spain fell from 42 to 7 percent while the share of employment in services rose from 26 to 63
percent. In about the same period, the labor share in agriculture in Belgium fell just from
9 to 2 percent, while the labor share in services rose from 43 to 75 percent.
In this paper we study the behavior of GDP per hour over time from the perspective
of sectoral productivity growth and the structural transformation.4 Is the reallocation of
labor across sectors important in understanding the behavior of aggregate productivity?
At a qualitative level, the answer to this question is clearly yes. Since aggregate labor
1See, for instance, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), Jones (1997), Prescott (2002), Duarte and
Restuccia (2006), among many others.
2We use GDP per hour as our measure of economic performance. Throughout the paper we refer to labor
productivity, output per hour, and GDP per hour interchangeably.
3All numbers reported refer to trend data using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. See Section 2 for details.
4See Baumol (1967) for a discussion of the implications of structural change on aggregate productivity
growth.
2productivity can be expressed as the sum of labor productivity across sectors weighted by
the share of labor in each sector, the structural transformation may matter for aggregate
productivity. At a quantitative level the answer depends on whether there are substantial
diﬀerences in sectoral labor productivity across countries. Our approach in this paper is
to ﬁrst develop a simple model of the structural transformation that is calibrated to the
growth experience of the United States. We then use the model to measure sectoral labor
productivity diﬀerences across countries. These measures, together with data on sectoral
labor productivity growth, imply time paths of sectoral labor productivity across countries.
We use these measures of sectoral labor productivity in the model to assess their quantitative
role on aggregate productivity outcomes across countries.
We ﬁnd that there are large and systematic diﬀerences in sectoral labor productivity
across countries. In particular, labor productivity diﬀerences between rich and poor coun-
tries are larger in agriculture and services but smaller in manufacturing. To illustrate the
implications of these diﬀerences for aggregate productivity, imagine that these productivity
diﬀerences remain constant as countries undergo the structural transformation. Then as
developing countries reallocate labor from agriculture to manufacturing, aggregate produc-
tivity can catch-up as labor is reallocated from a low relative productivity sector to a high
relative productivity sector. Instead, countries further along the structural transformation
can stagnate or decline as labor is reallocated from manufacturing (a high relative productiv-
ity sector) to services (a low relative productivity sector). When sectoral labor productivity
is fed into the model of the structural transformation, we ﬁnd that low productivity growth
in services accounts for all of the decline, stagnation, and slow-down in relative aggregate
productivity observed in more developed economies such as Canada and New Zealand. More-
over, productivity growth in industry accounts for more than 50 percent of the catch-up in
relative aggregate productivity observed in the 60s in many of the less developed economies
such as Spain and Austria.
We construct a panel data set on output per hour from the Penn World Table version
6.1 (PWT6.1) and the Total Economy Database, and disaggregated output and employment
observations for agriculture, industry, and services from a variety of sources (see the Ap-
3pendix for a detailed explanation). Our panel data includes 29 countries with data covering
the period from 1956 to 2000 for most countries.5 From these data, we document three
basic facts. First, countries follow a common process of structural transformation charac-
terized by a declining share of employment in agriculture over time, an increasing share of
employment in services, and a hump-shaped share of employment in industry. Second, there
is substantial lag in the process of structural transformation for some countries and this
lag is associated with the level of relative income. Third, there are sizable and systematic
diﬀerences in sectoral growth rates of labor productivity across countries. In particular,
whereas countries with high annualized growth rates of aggregate productivity observe high
growth rates of labor productivity in agriculture and specially manufacturing, that is not
the case for services. To put it diﬀerently, we ﬁnd that a large number of countries catching
up in aggregate productivity to the level of the United States are not catching up in labor
productivity in services. This ﬁnding partly explains the role of services in accounting for
growth experiences of stagnation and decline for the more advanced countries. Countries
with low annualized growth rates of aggregate labor productivity tend to observe low labor
productivity growth in all sectors.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model of the structural transformation with
three sectors − agriculture, industry, and services. Following Rogerson (2007), labor re-
allocation across sectors is driven by two channels: income eﬀects due to non-homothetic
preferences and substitution eﬀects due to diﬀerential productivity growth across sectors.6
We calibrate the model to the structural transformation of the United States between 1956
and 2000. A model of the structural transformation is essential for the purpose of this pa-
per for two reasons. First, we need the model to measure sectoral productivity diﬀerences
across countries. While there are many studies quantifying cross-country labor productivity
diﬀerences in some sectors (most notably the eﬀorts of the Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation, FAO, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, and
5Our sample does not include the poorest countries in the world: the relative labor productivity diﬀerence
between the richest and poorest countries in our data is a factor of only 10.
6For recent models of the structural transformation emphasizing non-homothetic preferences see
Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) and emphasizing substitution eﬀects see Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
4the McKinsey Global Institute, MGI), these studies do not provide enough information for
a systematic cross-country aggregate analysis over time. Moreover, these studies are typi-
cally done for narrowly deﬁned sectors. One reason for this lack of information is that the
data requirements for internationally comparable measures of sectoral output over time are
enormous. Nevertheless, in Section 4 we argue that our measured sectoral productivity dif-
ferences are broadly consistent with the sparse micro evidence available. Second, the process
of structural transformation is endogenous to the level and changes over time in sectoral
labor productivity. As a result, a quantitative assessment of the aggregate implications of
the structural transformation and sectoral productivity diﬀerences requires the changes in
the distribution of labor across sectors to be consistent with sectoral productivity.
This paper is related to a large literature studying income diﬀerences across countries.
Within this literature, our paper is connected to the literature studying international income
diﬀerences in the context of models with delay in the start of modern growth.7 Since countries
in our data set have started the process of structural transformation well before the ﬁrst year
in our sample, our focus is on measuring sectoral productivity across countries at a point in
time and on assessing the role of their movement over time in accounting for the patterns
of structural transformation and aggregate productivity experiences across countries.8 In
studying labor productivity over time, our paper is also related to a recent literature that
studies country episodes of slowdown and depression.9 Most of this literature focuses on the
role of exogenous movements in aggregate total factor productivity and aggregate distortions
on GDP per worker relative to trend. We diﬀer from this literature by emphasizing the
importance of the structural transformation and sectoral labor productivity on the secular
movements in relative GDP per hour across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we document some facts about the
process of structural transformation and sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
7See, for instance, Lucas (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Ngai (2004), and Gollin, Parente, and
Rogerson (2002).
8Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2006) also use a model to measure sectoral productivity diﬀerences across
countries. They use aggregate expenditure data in a model with four sectors.
9See Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and the references therein. See also Coleman (2007) and Adamopoulos
and Akyol (2007).
5Section 3 describes the economic environment and calibrates a benchmark economy to U.S.
data for the period between 1956 to 2000. In section 4 we discuss our quantitative experiment
and perform counterfactual analysis. We conclude in section 5.
2 Some Facts
In this section, we document the process of structural transformation and the behavior of
labor productivity in agriculture, industry, and services for the countries in our data set at
an annual frequency. Since we focus on long-run trends, data are trended using the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter λ = 100. For a detailed description of the data,
sample of countries, and time coverage for each country see the appendix.
2.1 The Process of Structural Transformation
The reallocation of labor across sectors over time is typically referred to in the economic
development literature as the process of structural transformation. This process has been
extensively documented.10 The structural transformation is characterized by a systematic
fall in the share of employment in agriculture over time, by a steady increase in the share
of employment in services, and by a hump-shaped pattern for the share of employment in
manufacturing. That is, the typical process of sectoral reallocation involves an increase in
the share of employment in manufacturing in the early stages of the reallocation process,
followed by a decrease in the later stages.11
Our panel data covers countries at very diﬀerent stages in the process of structural
transformation. For instance, our data includes countries that in 1960 have more than 70
percent of their employment in agriculture (e.g., Turkey and Bolivia), as well as countries
that in the same year have shares of employment in agriculture below 10 percent (e.g., the
United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the United States). Despite this diversity in the stage
10See, for instance, Kuznets (1966), Maddison (1980), among others.
11In this paper we refer to manufacturing and industry interchangeably. In the appendix we describe in
detail our deﬁnition of sectors in the data.
6of structural transformation across the sample, all countries follow a common process of
structural transformation, characterized by the features discussed above. First, all countries
exhibit declining shares of employment in agriculture, even the most advanced countries
in this process, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.12 Second, countries
at an early stage of the process of structural transformation exhibit a hump-shaped share
of employment in industry, while this share is decreasing for countries at a more advanced
stage. Finally, all countries exhibit increasing shares of employment in services. To illustrate
these features, Figure 2 plots sectoral shares of employment for Korea, Greece, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.13
The processes of structural transformation observed in our sample suggest two additional
observations. First, the lag in the structural transformation observed across countries is
systematically related to the level of development: poor countries are the ones with the
highest shares of employment in agriculture, while rich countries are the ones with the
lowest shares. (See, for instance, Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson, 2007, and Restuccia, Yang,
and Zhu, 2007, for a detailed documentation of this fact across a wider range of countries.)
Second, our data suggests the basic tendency for countries that start the process of structural
transformation later to accomplish a given amount of labor reallocation faster than those
countries that initiated this process earlier.14
12We focus on shares of employment across sectors because of the lack of sectoral data on average hours of
work. We also abstract from movements in the employment to population ratio. However, the employment
ratio is remarkably stable over time for most countries in our sample. In the model in section 3 we do
consider hours of work at the aggregate level since average hours have changed substantially over time for
some countries.
13An appendix available from the authors documents the process of structural transformation for all
countries in our data set.
14For instance, according to the Historical Statistics of the United States, the distribution of employment
in the United States circa 1870 resembles that of Portugal in 1950. By 1948 the sectoral shares in the United
States were 0.10, 0.34, and 0.56, levels that Portugal reached sometime during the 90’s. Although Portugal
is lagging behind the process of structural transformation in the United States, it has accomplished about
the same reallocation of labor across sectors in less than half the time (39 years as opposed to 89 years in
the United States). See Duarte and Restuccia (2007) for a detailed documentation of these observations.
72.2 Sectoral Labor Productivity Growth
For the United States, the annualized growth rate of labor productivity between 1956 and
2000 has been highest in agriculture (4.0 percent), second in industry (2.4 percent), and
lowest in services (1.5 percent).15 This ranking of growth rates of labor productivity across
sectors is observed in 23 out of the 29 countries in our sample and in all countries but
Venezuela the growth rate in services is the smallest. Nevertheless, there is an enormous
variation in sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
Figure 3 plots the annualized growth rate of labor productivity in each sector against
the annualized growth rate of aggregate labor productivity for all countries in our data set.
The sectoral growth rate of the United States in each panel is identiﬁed by the horizontal
dashed line while the vertical dashed line marks the growth rate of aggregate productivity
of the United States. This ﬁgure documents the tendency for countries to feature higher
growth rates of labor productivity in agriculture and manufacturing compared to services.
For instance, in our panel, the average growth rates in agriculture and manufacturing are
4.1 and 3.1 percent while the average growth rate in services is 1.3 percent. In addition,
note that the cross-country variation in labor productivity growth is higher in agriculture
and manufacturing than in services (with standard deviations of 1.6, 1.7, and 1).
Figure 3 also illustrates that countries with low relative aggregate labor productivity
growth tend to have low productivity growth in all sectors (e.g., Latin American countries)
while countries with high relative aggregate labor productivity growth tend to have higher
productivity growth in agriculture and, specially, industry than the United States (e.g.,
European countries, Japan, and Korea). Interestingly, note that for countries that grew
faster than the United States in aggregate productivity, labor productivity growth in services
is at or below the U.S. level with only a few exceptions. The fact is that most countries have
observed a lower growth rate of labor productivity in services than the United States. These
features of the data motivate the counterfactual exercises we perform in section 5.







We develop a simple model of the structural transformation of an economy where at each
date three goods are produced: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Following Rogerson
(2007), labor reallocation across sectors is driven by two forces: an income eﬀect due to
non-homothetic preferences and a substitution eﬀect due to diﬀerential productivity growth
between manufacturing and services. We calibrate a benchmark economy to U.S. data from
1956 to 2000 and show that this basic framework captures the salient features of the structural
transformation in the United States for the calibrated period.
3.1 Description
Production At each date there are three goods produced: agriculture (a), manufactur-
ing (m), and services (s) according to the following constant returns to scale production
functions:
Yi = AiLi, i ∈ {a,m,s}, (1)
where Yi is output in sector i, Li is labor allocated to production in sector i, and Ai is a
sector-speciﬁc technology parameter. When comparing our model to data, we associate the
labor input Li with the share of total hours allocated to sector i. Because of the lack of
sectoral data on hours we allocate total hours by the share of employment in each sector
(i.e., our identiﬁcation assumption is that hours of work are the same across sectors but
move over time according to aggregate hours in the data).
We assume that there is a continuum of homogeneous ﬁrms in each sector that are
competitive in output and factor markets. At each date, given the price of good-i output pi
and wages w, a representative ﬁrm in sector i solves:
max
Li≥0
{piAiLi − wLi}. (2)
Households The economy is populated by an inﬁnitely-lived representative household of
constant size. Without loss of generality we normalize the population size to one. The




tu(ct,ca,t), β ∈ (0,1),
where ca,t is the consumption of agricultural goods at date t and ct is the consumption of a
composite of manufacturing and service goods at date t. The per-period utility is given by:
u(ct,ca,t) = log(ct) + V (ca,t),
where V (ca,t) is non-homothetic. In particular, we assume that V is such that there is a
subsistence level of agricultural goods ¯ a below which the household cannot survive. This
feature of preferences has a long tradition in the development literature and it has been
emphasized as a quantitatively important feature leading to the movement of labor away
from agriculture in the process of structural transformation.16 Following Laitner (2000) and
Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), we further simplify the speciﬁcation of V by assuming
that households only care to consume the subsistence amount ¯ a. Formally, V (ca) = −∞
when ca < ¯ a, and V (ca) = min{ca,¯ a} when ca ≥ ¯ a. This feature of preferences makes
our analysis tractable. Nevertheless, as we discuss in subsection 3.3 and section 4, this
simple preference speciﬁcation reproduces the time behavior of the share of employment in
agriculture in the data remarkably well.





m,t + (1 − b)(cs,t + ¯ s)
ρ 1
ρ ,
where ¯ s > 0, b ∈ (0,1), and ρ < 1. Given ¯ s, these preferences imply that the income elasticity
of service goods is greater than one. The parameter ¯ s can be interpreted as a constant level
of production of service goods at home. Our approach to modeling the home sector for
services is reduced form. Rogerson (2007) considers a generalization of this feature where
16See, for instance, Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Caselli and
Coleman (2001), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2007).
10people can allocate time to market and non-market production of service goods. However,
we argue that our simpliﬁcation is not as restrictive as it may ﬁrst appear since we abstract
from the allocation of time between market and non-market activities. Our focus is on the
determination of aggregate productivity from the allocation of time across market sectors.
At each date and given prices, the household chooses consumption of each good to max-






m + (1 − b)(cs + ¯ s)
ρ]
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paca + pmcm + pscs = w.
In what follows we normalize the wage rate to one.
Market Clearing The demand for labor from ﬁrms must equal the exogenous supply of
labor by households at every date:
La + Lm + Ls = 1. (4)
Also, at each date, the market for each good produced must clear:
ca = Ya, cm = Ym, cs = Ys. (5)
3.2 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {pa,pm,ps}, allocations {ca,cm,cs} for the house-
hold, and allocations {La,Lm,Ls} for ﬁrms such that: (i) Given prices, ﬁrm’s alloca-
tions {La,Lm,Ls} solve the ﬁrm’s problem in (2), (ii) Given prices, household’s allocations
{ca,cm,cs} solve the household’s problem in (3), and (iii) markets clear: equations (4) and
(5) hold.
The ﬁrst order condition from the ﬁrm’s problem implies that the beneﬁt and cost of
11a marginal unit of labor must be equal. This condition implies that prices of goods are





since the wage rate is normalized to one.
Our speciﬁcation of V (ca) implies that ca = ¯ a and, therefore, the resource constraint of
agricultural goods implies that the labor allocation in agriculture is determined solely by the

















This equation can be re-written as:
Lm =
















and La is given by (7). Equation (8) reﬂects the two forces that drive labor reallocation
between manufacturing and services in the model. First, suppose that preferences are ho-
mothetic (i.e., ¯ s = 0). In this case, Ls/Lm = x and diﬀerential productivity growth in
manufacturing relative to services is the only source of labor reallocation between these two
sectors (through movements in x) as long as ρ is not equal to zero. In particular, when ¯ s = 0,
the model can be consistent with the observed labor reallocation from manufacturing into
services as labor productivity grows in the manufacturing sector relative to services if the
elasticity of substitution between these goods is low (ρ < 0). Second, suppose that ¯ s > 0
(i.e., preferences are non-homothetic) and that labor productivity grows at the same rate
12in manufacturing and services or that ρ = 0 (i.e., x is constant). In this case, for a given
share of labor in agriculture, productivity improvements lead to the reallocation of labor
from manufacturing into services (services are more income-elastic). The model allows both
channels to be operating during the structural transformation.
3.3 Calibration
We calibrate a benchmark economy to U.S. data for the period from 1956 to 2000. Our
calibration strategy involves selecting parameter values so that the equilibrium of the model
matches the salient features of the structural transformation for the United States during
this period. We assume that a period in the model is one year. We need to select parameters
values for b, ρ, ¯ a, ¯ s, and the time series of productivity for each sector Ai,t for t from 1956
to 2000 and i ∈ {a,m,s}. Table 1 reports a summary of calibrated parameters and targets.




t=1957 {·} Productivity Growth in Agriculture
{Am,t}2000
t=1957 {·} Productivity Growth in Industry
{As,t}2000
t=1957 {·} Productivity Growth in Services
¯ a 0.10 Employment in Agriculture 1956
¯ s 0.76 Employment in Industry 1956
b 0.04 Employment in Industry 1957-2000
ρ -1.5 Aggregate Productivity Growth
We proceed as follows. First, we normalize productivity levels across sectors to one
in 1956, i.e., Ai,1956 = 1 for all i ∈ {a,m,s}. Given this normalization, we use data on
sectoral labor productivity growth in the United States to obtain the time paths of sectoral
productivity. Given Aa,1956 = 1 we choose ¯ a to match the share of employment in agriculture
in the data for the United States in 1956.
Second, we restrict ¯ s, b, and ρ to match the share of employment in manufacturing over
time and the annualized growth rate of aggregate productivity. Given ρ and b, ¯ s is chosen
13to match the share of employment in manufacturing in the United States in 1956. Then b is
chosen so that, given the time path of labor productivity in industry relative to services, the
model roughly matches the time path for the share of employment in manufacturing. Since
ρ determines how much relative productivity growth is needed to produce a given realloca-
tion of labor across sectors, ρ produces diﬀerent patterns of aggregate productivity growth.
Hence, we select ρ to match the annualized growth rate of aggregate labor productivity. The
annualized labor productivity growth in the United States between 1956 and 2000 is 2.0
percent in PWT6.1.
The shares of employment implied by our model are reported in Figure 4 (dotted lines),
together with data on the shares of employment in the United States (solid lines). The
equilibrium sectoral employment shares implied by the model match closely the process
of structural transformation in the United States during the sample period. The model
implies a fall in the share of employment in manufacturing from about 38 percent in 1956
to 25 percent in 2000, while the employment share in services increases from about 53 to 72
percent during this period. Notice that even though the calibration only targets the share of
employment in agriculture in 1956, the simple preference speciﬁcation for agricultural goods
(such that agents only care to consume the level ¯ a) together with data on labor productivity
growth in agriculture implies an equilibrium employment share in agriculture over time that
is remarkably close to the data.
We ﬁnd that, given the observed time path of sectoral labor productivity in the United
States, the observed process of labor reallocation between manufacturing and services could
not be accomplished in the model without an income elasticity greater than one in services.
If we set ¯ s = 0, all else equal, then the model implies lower employment shares in industry
(and higher employment shares in services) than in the data and lower growth rate of ag-
gregate productivity. Instead, if we set ρ = 0, all else equal, then the model implies slightly
more labor reallocation to services (and less to industry) than the data and slightly lower
annualized growth rate of labor productivity.
An implication of the model is that the price of agricultural goods relative to manufac-







Given the sectoral labor productivity growth in the data for the United States, the model
implies that the relative price pa/pm falls from a normalized level of 1 in 1956 to about 0.5 in
2000. This fall in the relative price of agriculture is consistent with data for the implicit price
deﬂators for agriculture and manufacturing between 1971 and 2004, although the relative
price of agriculture falls somewhat more in the data than in the model.17
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we assess the quantitative role of the structural transformation and sectoral
labor productivity in determining aggregate productivity outcomes across countries. In this
analysis, we maintain preference parameters as in the benchmark economy and proceed in
two steps. First, we use the model to restrict relative sectoral labor productivity in the
ﬁrst period across countries.18 Second, using data on sectoral labor productivity growth in
each country, the model implies time paths for sectoral employment and relative aggregate
labor productivity for each country. We then perform a counterfactual analysis to assess the
role of sectoral productivity growth in the reallocation of labor and aggregate productivity
outcomes.
4.1 Relative Sectoral Productivity Levels
We use the model to restrict the levels of labor productivity in agriculture, industry, and
services relative to those in the United States for the ﬁrst year in the sample for each country.
Maintaining preference parameters, we choose the three relative labor productivity levels for
17The price data is obtained from the World Development Indicators and is consistent with the sectoral
deﬁnitions for labor productivity.
18In this analysis, we adjust ¯ s by the level of relative labor productivity in services in the ﬁrst period for
each country. Although not modeled explicitly, one interpretation of ¯ s is as service goods produced at home.
Therefore, ¯ s cannot be invariant to large changes in productivity levels in services.
15each country to match 3 targets from the data in the ﬁrst year in the sample: (1) the share
of employment in agriculture, (2) the share of employment in manufacturing (and together
with (1) the model therefore matches the share of employment in services), and (3) aggregate
labor productivity relative to the United States from PWT6.1.
Figure 5 plots the average level of sectoral relative labor productivity for each quintile of
aggregate productivity in the ﬁrst year. The model implies that relative sectoral productivity
in the ﬁrst year tends to be lower in poorer countries than in richer countries, but particularly
so in agriculture and services. In fact, the model implies that the dispersion of relative
productivity in agriculture and services is much larger than in manufacturing. In the ﬁrst
year, the 6 poorest countries have relative productivity in agriculture and services around
20 and 15 percent while the 6 richest countries have relative productivity in these sectors
around 88 and 93 percent. In contrast, for manufacturing, average relative productivity of
the 6 poorest countries in the ﬁrst year is 36 percent and that of the 6 richest countries is
82 percent.
The levels of sectoral relative labor productivity implied by the model for the ﬁrst year
together with observed growth rates of sectoral labor productivity in each country imply time
paths for sectoral relative productivity for each country. Figure 6 plots the average level of
sectoral relative labor productivity in the ﬁrst and last years for each quintile of aggregate
productivity in the ﬁrst year. We note that, on average, the countries in the top 3 quintiles
experienced substantial gains in productivity in agriculture and manufacturing relative to
the United States. In sharp contrast, on average, labor productivity in services in countries
in the top 2 quintiles declined relative to the United States during the sample period. These
features are suggestive of the results we will discuss in the next subsection. For example, all
countries in the third quintile experienced a fast catch-up to the United States during their
sample period and high growth rates of labor productivity in agriculture and industry.19 In
the next section we study the role of these high growth rates of sectoral labor productivity in
explaining the catch-up in aggregate productivity. In addition, note that all countries in the
top quintile (and most countries in the forth quintile) are developed economies that have,
19These countries are Spain, Austria, Italy, Finland, and Belgium.
16at some point, stagnated or declined relative to the United States in the recent decades.20
Note that these economies not only have lower relative levels of labor productivity in services
than the United States but they also observed a lower growth rate of labor productivity in
this sector. As these economies allocate an increasing share of employment to services, low
relative labor productivity in this sector dampens aggregate productivity. In the next section
we quantitatively study this mechanism and show it plays an important role in accounting
for all the stagnation and decline episodes of many developed economies in recent decades.
Some empirical studies provide internationally-comparable measures of labor productivity
for some sectors and some countries. These studies typically provide estimates for narrow
sectoral deﬁnitions at a given point in time. The productivity diﬀerences in agriculture
implied by the model are qualitatively consistent with the diﬀerences in output per worker
in agriculture between rich and poor countries implied by PPP-adjusted data from FAO for
1985.21 The OECD and MGI provide studies at diﬀerent levels of sectoral disaggregation
for manufacturing. These studies report relative productivity for a relatively small set of
countries and most studies report estimates only at one point in time. One exception is
Pilat (1996). This study reports relative labor productivity levels in manufacturing for 1960,
1973, 1985, and 1995 for 13 countries. While the implied relative labor productivity levels
in industry in our model tend to be higher than those reported in this study, the patterns of
relative productivity are consistent for most countries. Finally, consistent with our ﬁndings,
several studies report that the Unites States has higher levels and higher growth rates of
labor productivity in service sectors than other developed countries and that lower labor
productivity in service sectors compared to manufacturing is pervasive.22
As a ﬁrst pass in assessing the importance of labor reallocation across sectors, we can
use the time paths of relative labor productivity across sectors and countries to ask how
20In addition to the United States, these countries are New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and
Netherlands.
21See Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2007).
22Baily, Farrell, and Remes (2005) estimate that, with the exception of mobile telecommunications, France
and Germany had lower relative productivity levels in 2000 and had lower growth rates of labor productivity
between 1992 and 2000 for a set of narrowly-deﬁned service sectors. In another study, MGI reports relative
productivity levels in services and manufacturing for Turkey of 0.33 and 0.43 in 2000. The productivity
levels for services and industry implied by our model are 0.08 and 0.44.
17much of the changes in aggregate labor productivity over time can be accounted for by
movements in the share of employment across sectors. To illustrate these changes, Figure 7
shows the time path of relative aggregate labor productivity together with the implied path
for the case of no labor reallocation for Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and France. For
Italy and Spain, the 60’s and 70’s were characterized by substantial catch-up in aggregate
labor productivity to the U.S. level. During this period, labor was being reallocated from
agriculture into industry and services, both sectors observing higher relative productivity
than agriculture. Therefore, if labor reallocation had not occurred the catch-up would have
been much lower during this period. However, from the late 70’s and early 80’s onwards
the labor reallocation actually implies a slow-down in the catch-up process since most labor
reallocation is going from industry to services, a sector with lower relative productivity.
Strong labor reallocation towards services and a lower relative productivity in this sector
also account for the negative impact of labor reallocation on aggregate productivity in the
United Kingdom and in France’s later sample period.
These calculations are only suggestive of the possible implications of labor reallocation
across sectors for aggregate productivity. Since the movements of labor across sectors are
endogenous to changes in sectoral labor productivity, a model of these endogenous movements
is needed to make the assessment of a counterfactual situation in terms of labor productivity
growth. In the next subsection we do just that.
4.2 The Structural Transformation and Counterfactuals
Given the time paths for sectoral labor productivity, the model has time-series implications
for shares of employment across sectors and aggregate labor productivity for each country (4
time series). The model reproduces the salient features of the structural transformation and
aggregate productivity over time across countries. To illustrate this performance, Figure 8
reports the percentage change in the average value of each time series in the ﬁrst 5 years
of the country’s sample period relative to its average value in the last 5 years both in the
data and in the model for each country. The model replicates well the basic time trends
in sectoral shares of employment and relative aggregate productivity observed in the data,
18particularly so for the share of employment in agriculture and relative aggregate productivity.
Figure 8 attests the ability of the simple preference speciﬁcation for agricultural goods in
replicating the basic trend observed for the share of employment in agriculture across a large
cross-section of countries. Regarding the share of employment in industry, the model tends
to imply a lower growth over the time series compared to the data, particularly so for less
developed economies where the share of employment in industry increased over the sample
period. Conversely, the model tends to imply a higher growth of the share of employment
in services over the sample period than that observed in the data. This feature of the
model suggests that, specially for less developed countries, frictions to the reallocation of
labor between manufacturing and services are important in accounting for their structural
transformation.
While in most cases the model does well in reproducing the time series in the data,
in some countries, modiﬁcations to the simple model would be required in order to better
account for the process of structural transformation and relative aggregate productivity
(see, for instance, Duarte and Restuccia, 2007, for an application of wedges across sectors
in Portugal). These richer environments, however, would require country-speciﬁc analysis.
We instead maintain our simple model speciﬁcation and perform counterfactual experiments
for countries in which the model does well in reproducing the time series of employment
and aggregate productivity. We leave the other interesting country-speciﬁc experiences for
further and future research.
We construct a series of counterfactuals aimed at assessing the role of the structural
transformation and relative sectoral labor productivity on aggregate productivity experiences
across countries. We focus on two sets of counterfactuals. The ﬁrst set focuses on catch-up
growth experiences that are associated with high relative growth rates of labor productivity
in industry. The second set focuses on decline, stagnation, and slow-down growth experiences
that are associated with low productivity in the service sector.
To start, we consider the growth experience of Spain. In 1960, aggregate labor productiv-
ity in Spain was 42 percent of that of the United States; by the mid 70’s, relative aggregate
productivity had increased to 65 percent but it stagnated during the 80’s and 90’s. During
19this period, relative productivity in industry increased from 49 to more than 71 percent. In
the ﬁrst counterfactual we ask about the aggregate implications of this substantial growth
in labor productivity in industry. We compute the equilibrium implications for the alloca-
tion of employment and aggregate productivity under the scenario that labor productivity
in industry had grown at the same rate as in the United States. Table 2 reports the equi-
librium implications of this counterfactual scenario. While there is no substantial change
in labor reallocation, relative aggregate productivity increases to only 54 percent. Figure 9
documents the time path of relative aggregate productivity in Spain (implied by the model
and in the data) and for the counterfactual.
Table 2: Counterfactuals − Spain
Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate
Model:
Li,1960 0.42 0.32 0.26 −
Li,2000 0.04 0.23 0.73 −
Relative Ai,1960 0.25 0.49 0.59 0.42
Relative Ai,2000 0.58 0.71 0.53 0.60
Counterfactual – industry:
Li,2000 0.04 0.25 0.71 −
Relative Ai,2000 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.54
Counterfactual – services:
Li,2000 0.04 0.24 0.72 −
Relative Ai,2000 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.72
Counterfactual (1) assumes a growth rate of labor productivity in industry in Spain of 2.4
percent (the annualized growth rate in the United States) instead of the observed 3.4 percent.
Counterfactual (2) assumes a growth rate of labor productivity in services in Spain of 2.1
percent instead of the observed 1.3 percent so it achieves relative productivity in services of
71 percent by 2000.
We perform identical counterfactuals for other countries that have observed both a sub-
stantial catch-up in relative productivity as well as high relative productivity growth in
industry. Figure 9 reports the aggregate productivity implications of identical productivity
growth in industry as in the United States for Norway, Austria, and Belgium. Notice that
20these countries were between 40 to 60 percent of aggregate labor productivity of the United
States in 1960. These countries also experienced relatively high labor productivity growth in
industry as documented previously and, for some of these countries, productivity growth in
agriculture promoted a substantial reallocation of labor away from agriculture. We conclude
from these counterfactual experiments that relative productivity growth in industry accounts
for more than 50 percent of relative aggregate productivity catch-up in these countries.
Next, we consider a diﬀerent set of counterfactuals aimed at assessing the importance
of productivity growth in services for experiences of decline, stagnation, and slow-down
among developed economies. We start with Canada. Canada is among the countries that is
closest to the United States in terms of the process of structural transformation. In 1956,
labor productivity in Canada was 92 percent of that in the United States. By 2000, it had
declined to 83 percent. As a result of low labor productivity growth in services, productivity
in services declined from 98 to 73 percent of the level in the United States during this period
(see Table 2. We ask about the aggregate implications of labor productivity in services
in Canada growing at the same rate as in the United States during this period (and thus
Canada maintaining the relative productivity level of services in 1956). The results of this
counterfactual are reported in Table 3. This counterfactual would have implied a further
increase in relative aggregate productivity from 92 percent to 99 percent in 2000 (Figure 10
reports the implied time path).
New Zealand is another country that has recently observed a decline in relative aggregate
productivity, from close to 1 in 1971 to less than 70 percent in 2000. In 1971, relative labor
productivity in services in New Zealand was about 96 percent. However, between 1971 and
2000 productivity growth in services in New Zealand was -0.24 percent and by 2000 relative
productivity in services was 60 percent. If New Zealand had the same productivity growth
in services as in the United States, relative aggregate productivity would have declined much
less, to slightly less than 90 percent (see Figure 10).
Spain after the mid 70’s and the United Kingdom are two experiences of relative stag-
nation and slow-down. Both these countries observed an important catch-up in relative
productivity in industry during the entire period (Spain from 49 to 71 percent and the
21Table 3: Counterfactual − Canada
Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate
Model:
Li,1956 0.16 0.35 0.49 −
Li,2000 0.05 0.22 0.73 −
Relative Ai,1956 0.64 0.97 0.98 0.92
Relative Ai,2000 0.53 1.11 0.73 0.83
Counterfactual:
Li,2000 0.05 0.23 0.72 −
Relative Ai,2000 0.53 1.11 0.98 0.99
Counterfactual assumes a growth rate of labor productivity in services to main-
tain the relative productivity with the United States in 1956. This requires a
growth rate of 1.5 percent observed in the United States during the period as
opposed to the observed 0.96 percent in Canada.
United Kingdom from 40 to 91 percent) but both countries failed to catch-up in services
(it fell from 59 to 53 percent in Spain and from 70 to 67 percent in the United Kingdom).
In these two cases we ask about the aggregate implications of services catching up to 71
and 91 percent of the level of the United States.23 The time path of these counterfactuals
are reported in Figure 10. Both the stagnation and slow-down in relative aggregate pro-
ductivity in Spain and the United Kingdom are accounted for by relative slow growth in
services. Note that these countries were above 60 percent of aggregate labor productivity
of the United States in 1960. For all these countries there was a substantial reallocation
of labor towards services and low relative labor productivity growth in services. Overall,
low relative productivity growth in services accounts for all of the decline, stagnation, or
slow-down of relative aggregate labor productivity in these countries.
We conclude with these counterfactuals that, while productivity convergence in man-
ufacturing (and agriculture) are essential in the ﬁrst stages of the process of structural
transformation, the poor relative performance in services has determined a slowdown and
23For the United Kingdom, the annualized growth rate of labor productivity in services observed between
1956 and 2000 was 1.4 percent while the implied growth rate in this counterfactual is 2.1 percent. For Spain,
see the notes to Table 2.
22decline in aggregate productivity for the more advanced countries in this process.
5 Conclusions
We documented the reallocation of labor over time between agriculture, manufacturing, and
services and the growth rate of sectoral labor productivity across countries. While countries
are going through a common process of structural transformation, we found that there is
substantial lag diﬀerences in this process. We also found that most countries tend to observe
low productivity growth in services compared to agriculture or manufacturing even though
there is a big variation in sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
Using a model of the structural transformation that is calibrated to the experience of
the United States, we showed that sectoral diﬀerences in labor productivity can account
for diﬀerences in the process of structural transformation and aggregate productivity across
countries. We found that sectoral labor productivity diﬀerences across countries are large
and systematic both at a point in time and over time. In particular, labor productivity
diﬀerences between rich and poor countries are large in agriculture and services and smaller
in manufacturing, and all countries have a lower level of productivity in services than the
Unites States. An implication of these ﬁndings is that, as countries move through the process
of structural transformation, relative aggregate labor productivity can ﬁrst increase (as labor
moves from agriculture to manufacturing) and later stagnate or decline (as labor moves from
agriculture and manufacturing to services).
This paper highlights the role of labor productivity diﬀerences across sectors for aggre-
gate productivity. In particular, whereas labor productivity in manufacturing accounts for
more than 50 percent of the catch-up in aggregate productivity in developing countries, labor
productivity in services accounts for most of the stagnation and decline in aggregate pro-
ductivity in more developed economies. Thus, understanding the sources of cross-country
diﬀerences in labor productivity across sectors is crucial. What factors contribute to cross-
country diﬀerences in labor productivity across sectors? Why were countries able to catch-up
in manufacturing productivity and not in services? What are the barriers that prevent other
23developed economies to sustain growth rates of labor productivity in services as high as in
the United States? How are trade openness and regulation related to these productivity
diﬀerences across countries? We leave these important questions for future research.
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26A Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
We build a panel data of 29 countries on PPP-adjusted GDP per hour (in constant prices),
and employment and output per worker (in constant prices) for agriculture, industry, and
services. The countries covered in our data set are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal,
Sweden, Turkey, Venezuela, United Kingdom, and United States. The time period covered
varies across countries, but it ranges from 1956 to 2000 for most countries.
A.1 Aggregate Data
We use data from Penn World Tables version 6.1. (see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002)24
to construct annual time series of PPP-adjusted GDP in constant prices, PPP-adjusted GDP
per worker in constant prices, and total employment for each country. These three series
cover the period 1950 to 2000 for all countries with the exception of Chile, Greece, Sweden
(1951-2000), and Korea (1953-2000).
We construct total employment L using the variables Population (POP), Real GDP Chain
per worker (RGDPWOK), and Real GDP Chain per capita (RGDPCH) as
L = (RGDPCH × POP)/RGDPWOK.
We construct PPP-adjusted GDP in constant prices using the variables Real GDP per
capita in Constant Prices (RGDPL) and Population (POP) as GDP = RGDPL×POP. The
series for PPP-adjusted GDP per worker in constant prices is computed as Y L = GDP/L.
We use aggregate data on annual hours worked per employee from Total Economy
Database, maintained by Groningen Growth and Development Center, to construct annual
time series of PPP-adjusted GDP per hour in constant prices for each country. The series
for hours cover the period 1950 to 2002 for all countries, with the exception of Korea (1963-
2005). We construct PPP-adjusted GDP per hour in constant prices as Y Lh = Y L/H,
where H is annual hours worked by employee.
A.2 Sectoral Data
We obtain annual data on employment and output for agriculture, industry, and services
for all the countries listed above. The sectors are deﬁned by the International Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation, revision 3 (ISIC III) deﬁnitions, with agriculture corresponding to
ISIC divisions 1-5 (agriculture, forestry, hunting, and ﬁshing), industry to ISIC divisions 10-
45 (mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas), and services to ISIC
divisions 50-99 (wholesale and retail trade – including hotels and restaurants, transport, and
government, ﬁnancial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and
real estate services).
24Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for Interna-
tional Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
27A.2.1 Value Added by Sector
Value added by sector is obtained by combining data from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators online25 and historical data from the OECD National Accounts publications
for the following countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
The data series from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators are agriculture-
value added, industry-value added, and services-value added. All series are measured in
constant local currency units (base year 1995). These series cover the following time peri-
ods: Australia (1971-2000), Austria (1971-2000), Belgium (1971-2000), Canada (1971-2000),
Denmark (1966-2000), Finland (1960-2000), France (1971-2000), Greece (1960-2000), Italy
(1970-2000), Japan (1960-2000), Korea (1972-2000), Netherlands (1971-2000), New Zealand
(1977-2000), Norway (1971-2000), Portugal (1971-2000), Spain (1971-2000), Sweden (1971-
2000), Turkey (1968-2000), United Kingdom (1971-2000), and United States (1971-2000).
The series from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators are extended backwards
using historical data from the OECD National Accounts publications, except for Greece,
Japan, and Korea.26 A combination of three OECD publications was used: National Ac-
counts of OECD Countries (1950-1968), National Accounts of OECD Countries (1950-1961),
and National Accounts of OECD Countries (1960-1977). The primary resource was the book
covering the period from 1950 to 1968. We compute growth rates of the OECD data for
corresponding variables for years prior to those available through the World Bank and apply
them to the World Bank series. After this step the ﬁrst year of data on output per worker by
sector for this set of countries is: Australia (1964), Austria (1960), Belgium (1956), Canada
(1956), Denmark (1960), Finland (1959), France (1970), Greece (1960) Italy (1956), Japan
(1960), Korea (1972), Netherlands (1960), New Zealand (1971), Norway (1956), Portugal
(1956), Spain (1960), Sweden (1960), Turkey (1960), United Kingdom (1956), and United
States (1956).
Data on value added by sector at constant prices for Ireland are obtained from the
national accounts division of the Central Statistics Oﬃce of Ireland. These series cover the
period from 1970 to 1995 and are extended backwards to 1958 using historical data from the
OECD National Accounts publications (as described above).
Data on value added by sector for all Latin American countries in our data set (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) are obtained from
CEPALHISTAT: Database of Historical Data, maintained by CEPAL.27 This database has
data on “GDP by branch of economic activity, constant prices” (base year by country) for
10 sectors and it covers the period 1950-2003 for all countries. These data are aggregated
25“World Development Indicators,” World Bank. (1960-2004). Available on-line:
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>.
26“National Accounts of OECD Countries” (1950-1968); “National Accounts of OECD Countries,” (De-
tailed Tables, Volume II, 1950-1961); “National Accounts of OECD Countries,” (Detailed Tables, Volume
II, 1960-1977).
27“CEPALHISTAT: Database of Historical Data,” Comisi´ on Econ´ omica para Am´ erica Latina y el Caribe.
Available on-line: <http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/consulta.asp.>
28into agriculture, industry, and services using ISIC III deﬁnitions.





, i = a,m,s,
where V Ai is value added in sector i. We multiply these shares by the series of GDP in
constant prices computed from the Penn World Tables to obtain series of output by sector.
Although the growth rates of aggregate GDP for each country implied by the aggregation
of sectoral value added and the PWT6.1 are close for most countries, the adjustment above
guarantees that the growth rates of aggregated series and PWT series match up exactly. We
note however that even though the resulting sectoral outputs for these calculations are in the
same currency units (constant 1996 international dollars) we do not use these levels in our
calculations, only their implied sectoral growth rates. The reason is that these implied levels
of output across sectors depend on a PPP-conversion factor that diﬀers across countries but
that is common across sectors. There is substantial evidence that the PPP-conversion factors
diﬀer systematically across sectors in development. We instead use the model to back-out
sector-speciﬁc PPP-conversion factors across countries.
A.2.2 Employment by Sector
The sectoral employment data is obtained from a variety of sources as well. We compile
series of total civilian employment in each broad sector, as deﬁned by ISIC III. Aggregations
of the sub-sectors were completed by the agency providing the data, except in the case of
the Latin American data.
The OECD Database on Labor Force Statistics online28 is used to obtain data for the
following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States from 1956
to 2003. Data for Austria, Denmark, Greece, and Sweden is obtained from Source OECD,
Outlooks and Annuals, Labor Force Statistics. These series were available from 1960 to
2004.29 Data for Portugal on sectoral employment is obtained from the data set S´ eries
Longas para a Economia Portuguesa of the Bank of Portugal.30 The data is aggregated into
the same three broad sectors. The data covers the period 1953-1995. The data for the Latin
American countries is obtained from CEPALHISTAT: Database of Historical Data, and it
covers the period 1950-2003. These data is deﬁned for 10 broad sectors, which we aggregate
into the three broad sectors using the ISIC III deﬁnitions.
We use the sectoral employment data to construct shares of employment by sector for
28“Labour Force Statistics,” Source OECD: Outlooks & Annuals (1960-2004). Available on-line:
<http://hermia.sourceoecd.org/vl=718832/cl=16/nw=1/rpsv/outlook annuals.htm.>
29“Labor Market Statistics Database,” OECD Corporate Data Environment (1956-2003). Available online:
<http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp.>
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where Li is employment in sector i. We multiply these shares by the series of total employ-
ment from the Penn World Tables to obtain series of employment by sector.
The lack of sectoral data on hours of work prevents us from constructing series for the
share of total hours. Nevertheless, we use total hours and divide them according to the
constructed shares of employment. The implicity assumption is that hours of work are
constant across sectors but vary over time according to total hours. Hence, hours by sector
are obtained by multiplying total hours by the sector share of employment.
We construct value added per hour by sector by dividing, for each sector, our constructed
series of output with the corresponding series of hours.
All series are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter λ =
100 before any ratios are computed.
30Figure 1: Relative GDP per Hour – Some Countries










































31Figure 2: Shares of Employment





































32Figure 3: Sectoral Growth Rates of Labor Productivity (%)











































































































Annualized Growth Rate of Aggregate Labor Productivity
Note: Annualized growth rates during the sample period for each country. The horizontal
lines indicate the sectoral growth rates observed in the United States and the vertical line
indicates the aggregate growth rate of the United States.
33Figure 4: Share of Employment by Sector - Model vs. U.S. Data






































34Figure 5: Relative Labor Productivity across Sectors - ﬁrst year







































Quintile of Aggregate Productivity (first year)
35Figure 6: Relative Labor Productivity across Sectors - ﬁrst and last years











































Quintile of Aggregate Productivity (first year)
36Figure 7: Importance of Labor Reallocation – some countries





























































































Share of Employment in Industry
































































Each plot reports the percentage change in the variable’s average value in the ﬁrst 5 years
relative to its average value in the last 5 years in the data and in the model.
38Figure 9: Counterfactuals – Importance of Industry





























39Figure 10: Counterfactuals – Importance of Services
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